1 DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT Department of Industrial Relations State of California 2 BY: DAVID L. GURLEY (Bar No. 194298) 455 Golden Gate Ave., 9th Floor З San Francisco, CA 94102 Telephone: (415) 703-4863 4 Attorney for the Labor Commissioner 5 BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSIONER 6 OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 9 Case No. TAC 29-00 MARTHA ROBI, 10 Petitioners, DETERMINATION OF 11 lvs. CONTROVERSY 12 13 HOWARD B. WOLF, Respondents. 14 15 16 INTRODUCTION 17 The above-captioned petition was filed on September 1, 18 by MARTHA ROBI, (hereinafter "Robi" or "Petitioner"), 2000, 19 alleging that HOWARD B. WOLF, (hereinafter "Wolf" or "Respondent"), 20 booked performances on behalf of the petitioner's husband without 21 a talent agency license, thereby acting as an unlicensed talent 22 agent in violation of Labor Code §1700.5¹. Petitioner seeks a 23 determination voiding ab initio several written and one oral 24 management agreement between the parties. 25 26 All statutory citations will refer to the California Labor Code unless otherwise specified. 27

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1 Respondent filed his answer with this agency on October 2 3, 2000, asserting laches, statute of limitations, and release as 3 his affirmative defenses. A hearing was scheduled before the 4 undersigned attorney, specially designated by Labor the 5 Commissioner to hear this matter. After several continuances, the 6 hearing commenced on August 14, 2001, in Los Angeles, California. 7 Petitioner was represented by Allen Hyman; respondent appeared 8 through his attorney Terran T. Steinhart. Due consideration having 9 been given to the testimony, documentary evidence, arguments 10 presented, and briefs submitted, the Labor Commissioner adopts the 11 following determination of controversy.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Petitioner's husband, Paul Robi was an original 1. 14 member of the performing group, "The Platters". "The Platters" 15 established a string of #1 hits including, "Only You" and "The 16 Great Pretender" and performed internationally throughout the 50's, 17 60's. Several original members interchanged, but Paul Robi legally 18 retained the group's commercial name and continued to perform as 19 "The Platters" throughout the 70's and 80's. 20

21 2. In 1983 Paul Robi met Howard Wolf at the Tropicana 22 Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada. On May 4, 1983, Paul Robi 23 and Wolf signed an agreement, whereby Wolf would produce a 24 nostalgia show utilizing "The Platters", called "Golden Memories on 25 Tour". Wolf's responsibilities for the tour, pursuant to the terms 26 of the agreement included, "negotiating on behalf of the show, and 27

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1 show." Soon thereafter, Wolf sought to exclusively manage Robi's
2 career as a performing artist.

3 On November 18, 1983, Paul Robi and Howard Wolf 3. 4 signed a one-year agreement whereby Wolf agreed to personally 5 manage Robi's career in exchange for 10% of Robi's gross 6 compensation. The agreement provided that Wolf would advise and 7 counsel, inter alia, any and all matters pertaining to public 8 relations; the adoption of proper formats for presentation; and ⁹ other general practices in the entertainment industry. Notably, a 10 provision informing Robi that Howard could not act as a talent 11 agent or seek or obtain employment for Robi was also included. At 12 the expiration of the one-year agreement, Robi and Wolf agreed to 13 continue the relationship and executed ostensibly the same agreement in both 1984 and 1985. 14

4. On July 28, 1986, Paul Robi and Wolf appeared
to terminate the agreement by executing a mutual release from
17 liability. The release provided in pertinent part:

"I hereby release you from any further liability or obligation to perform services under the aforesaid Personal Management agreement and I release you from any obligation or claim to obligations for services rendered or required to be rendered under that agreement in the past. In doing so I waive all claims against you, known or unknown..."

5. The testimony conflicted as to why the parties executed the release and whether the release truly manifested the parties intent. The petitioner argued the release was a sham designed to protect the assets of the relationship from Wolf's

1 pending bankruptcy petition and further argued the parties 2 continued to function as they always had. The petitioner 3 established through documentary and testimonial evidence, that 4 irrespective of the mutual release, Wolf continued to act as Robi's 5 personal manager via an oral agreement under the same terms. Robi, 6 supplied deposit statements evidencing the collection of 7 commissions by Wolf for performances completed after the mutual 8 release was executed by the parties. In short, it was clear the 9 parties acted under the terms of an oral agreement for continued representation and the mutual release, prepared by Wolf, was not 10 11 the true intent of the parties.

12 In support of Robi's allegation that Wolf acted as 6. a talent agency by procuring work, Robi introduced several 13 The "Agreements", admittedly prepared by Wolf, "Agreements". 14 contained all of the material terms between the artist [Robi], and 15 the purchaser of talent [venue], including compensation and 16 perquisites. Wolf unconvincingly argued that the petitioner would 17 procure the engagements herself on behalf of her husband, and then 18 phone in the information to Wolf who would simply fill in the terms 19 on his preprinted agreement forms. This testimony was not 20 In sum, it was Wolf who negotiated the terms of the credible. 21 deals and it was Wolf who procured these engagements on Robi's 22 behalf. 23

7. On February 25, 1988, Paul Robi, unequivocally
terminated the relationship with Howard Wolf. In 1989 Paul Robi
passed away and control of the estate passed to the petitioner.
Throughout the latter part of Paul Robi's life and thereafter, the

1 petitioner was engaged in several lawsuits, litigating the right to 2 control "The Platters" name. In 1990, the petitioner prevailed in 3 one federal lawsuit and was awarded \$3,510,000.00. As a result of 4 petitioner's victory in the federal action, the respondent filed 5 two state court actions against the petitioner in 1996 and 1998, 6 seeking 10% of the \$3,510,000.00 award and 10% of all gross income 7 for the sale of a Platters' recording. The second state action is 8 stayed pending this Labor Commissioner's Determination of 9 Controversy.

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Labor Code §1700.4(b) includes "musical artists" in
 the definition of "artist" and petitioner is therefore an "artist"
 within the meaning of §1700.4(b).

15 2. The primary issue is whether based on the evidence 16 presented at this hearing, did the respondent operate as a "talent 17 agency" within the meaning of §1700.40(a). Labor Code §1700.40(a) 18 defines "talent agency" as, "a person or corporation who engages in 19 the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to 20 procure employment or engagements for an artist or artists."

Labor Code section 1700.5 provides that "no person 3. 21 shall engage in or carry on the occupation of a talent agency 22 without first procuring a license therefor from the Labor 23 There was some testimony that the respondent Commissioner." 24 obtained a talent agency license, but did not act as petitioner's 25 talent agency. The express relationship between Robi and Wolf was 26 a personal management agreement. Therefore, whether respondent 27

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1 obtained a talent agency license is irrelevant for this proceeding. 2 A manager may not switch hats. If the manager embarks on a 3 personal management relationship with a client, and subsequently 4 obtains a talent agency license, the possession of a talent agency 5 license will not insulate a manager acting as an agent for his б client from liability. Any person obtaining employment for an 7 artist will be subject to all of the state's talent agency 8 requirements.

9 4. In <u>Waisbren v. Peppercorn Production, Inc</u> (1995) 41 10 Cal.App.4th 246, the court held that any single act of procuring 11 employment subjects the agent to the Talent Agencies Act's licensing requirements, thereby upholding the Labor Commissioner's 12 long standing interpretation that a license is required for any 13 procurement activities, no matter how incidental such activities 14 15 are to the agent's business as a whole. Applying <u>Waisbren</u>, it is clear respondent acted in the capacity of a talent agency within 16 17 the meaning of §1700.4(a).

Respondent argued the petitioner did not meet her 5. 18 burden of proof. The burden of proof is found at Evidence Code 19 §115 which states, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the 20 burden of proof requires proof by preponderance of the evidence." 21 Further, McCoy v. Board of Retirement of the County of Los Angeles 22 Employees Retirement Association (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1044 at 1051 23 states, "the party asserting the affirmative at an administrative 24 hearing has the burden of proof, including both the initial burden 25 of going forward and the burden of persuasion by preponderance of 26

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¹ the evidence (cite omitted). "Preponderance of the evidence" ² standard of proof requires the trier of fact to believe that the ³ existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence. In re ⁴ <u>Michael G.</u> 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 642, 63 Cal.App.4th 700.

5 6. Here, the petitioner has established by a 6 preponderance of the evidence the respondent procured employment 7 reflected by the petitioner's credible testimony, and supported by 8 "Agreements" between Robi and the purchaser of the several 9 performance, negotiated and completed by the respondent. The 10 defense proffered by respondent that all of these "Agreements" were 11 actually procured by the petitioner was not supported by the 12 evidence. The evidence presented satisfies the minimal standard 13 described in Waisbren.

14 7. Finally, the respondent argues that the petition 15 should be dismissed because the statute of limitations for a 16 violation of the Act had run. Labor Code §1700.44(c) provides that 17 "no action or proceeding shall be brought pursuant to [the Talent 18 Agencies Act] with respect to any violation which is alleged to 19 have occurred more than one year prior to the commencement of this 20 action or proceeding.

Petitioner alleges violations that occurred between 8. 21 The petition was filed on September 1, 2000. 1983 and 1988. The 22 question arises whether the management agreements can be voided. 23 The recent California Supreme Court case of Styne v. They can. 24 Stevens 26 Cal.4th 42, held, "that statutes of limitations do not 25 apply to defenses..... Under well-established authority, a defense 26

1 may be raised at any time, even if the matter alleged would be 2 barred by a statute of limitations if asserted as the basis for 3 affirmative relief. The rule applies in particular to contract 4 actions. One sued on a contract may urge defenses that render the 5 contract unenforceable, even if the same matters, alleged as 6 grounds for restitution after rescission, would be untimely. Styne, 7 supra at p. 51; 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Actions, § 8 423, p. 532.

9 9. We thus conclude, §1700.44(c) does not bar the
10 petitioner from asserting illegality of the contracts in defense of
11 respondent's superior court action for breach of contract.

12 10. The aforementioned 1983, 1984, 1985 and subsequent 13 oral agreements between the parties are hereby void *ab initio* and 14 are unenforceable for all purposes. <u>Waisbren v. Peppercorn Inc.</u>, 15 <u>supra</u>, 41 Cal.App. 4th 246; <u>Buchwald v. Superior Court, supra</u>, 254 16 Cal.App.2d 347. Moreover, a release from liability for a voided 17 contract also has no bearing.

<u>ORDER</u>

For the above-stated reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 1983, 1984, 1985, and subsequent oral contracts between petitioner MARTHA ROBI and HOWARD B. WOLF, are unlawful and void ab initio. Respondent has no enforceable rights under those contracts.

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SEP-11-2002 15:23 DLSE P.37/47 415 703 4807 **-** · 1. 1 Dated: March 21, 2002 DAVID L. GURLEY Attorney for the Labor Commissioner ADOPTED AS THE DETERMINATION OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER: Dated: March 21, 2002 ARTHUR S. LÚJAN State Labor Commissioner